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ACADEMIC COMMENTARY

The Ever-Shrinking Case for a Constitutional
Right to Same-Sex Marriage
Thursday 6 February 2014 at 8:35 PM ET

edited by Brent Nesbitt

JURIST Guest Columnist James Dwyer of William & Mary Law School argues that the many
incremental successes the same-sex marriage movement has had actually make it more
difficult plausibly to argue now that every state is constitutionally required to issue
marriage certificates to same-sex couples. The legal and factual premises on which Virginia
Attorney General Mark Herring relies are simply not true today ...

In declaring Virginia's exclusion of same-sex couples from its marriage laws
unconstitutional, and announcing that his office would not defend the law,
Virginia Attorney General Mark Herring explained that because the law
infringes a fundamental right, gays and lesbians need legal marriage for
"orderly pursuit of happiness," homosexuals constitute a subordinated group
insufficiently protected by the political process, courts should subject the law
to strict scrutiny. Such an argument would have been persuasive at the
beginning of this century, but not today.
On New Year's Eve 1999, a same-sex couple wanting legally to tie the knot could not secure legal
marital status anywhere in the US, could not obtain the federal or state benefits that attach to
legal marriage and indeed in many states were vulnerable to criminal prosecution for having an
intimate relationship. At that time, it made sense to say the state interfered profoundly with the
liberty, privacy and equal citizenship of homosexuals. Even then, however, a same-sex couple
anywhere in the US could have held a wedding ceremony, without state-issued license, and
declared love and commitment to each other; the First Amendment would have precluded any

state from prohibiting such private gathering and expression. Further, in practice, such a couple
would have been free to share a home and intimate life, to act as a family, even in a state that
criminalized homosexual conduct, because states generally did not enforce such laws.
Today both the legal and social climates for homosexuals are vastly different from what they
were in 2000. Today, as a result of Lawrence v. Texas, every adult in the US has a recognized
Constitutional right to live with and share an intimate relationship with another consenting adult
of the same sex or a different sex, whether married to each other or not. Moreover, today any
same-sex couple living anywhere in America can get legally married. Such a couple could not
secure a state-issued marriage license and certificate in Virginia, or in thirty or so other states,
but a couple that lives in Virginia could drive to Maryland or fly to Boston and get legally married
there. As a result of the Supreme Court's decision in Windsor v. US and a subsequent IRS
Revenue Ruling, the federal government would thereafter treat the couple as legally married,
even though they return to Virginia to live. They could file their federal income tax forms as a
married couple and enjoy all the benefits the federal government confers on spouses.
The one way this couple's situation would differ from that of a heterosexual married couple in
Virginia is that state agencies would not treat them as legally married. They might be better off in
some ways as single persons (e.g., higher welfare payments or lower taxes), worse off in other
ways (e.g., if not treated as spouses for health insurance or inheritance purposes). Even assuming
it a net financial disadvantage to be denied Virginia's recognition of their marriage, that hardly
amounts to infringement of a fundamental right. No one has a fundamental right to a particular
tax-filing status, to piggyback on another person's employment for material benefits or to inherit.
There is also a stigma resulting from state non-recognition. I would not presume to judge the
stigma's severity as sexual-orientation minorities experience it, but as a matter of constitutional
doctrine avoiding such stigma is also not a matter of fundamental right. Members of religious
minorities for whom polygamy is a sacred obligation must also feel some stigma from state
refusal to recognize their plural intimate relationships, and likewise with individuals who want to
marry their first cousin in states that refuse to issue marriage licenses to people in such
"consanguineous" relationships. It is unlikely any court would treat that stigma as so threatening
to basic wellbeing as to implicate a fundamental right.
The Supreme Court has said legal marriage is a fundamental right, in several decisions Attorney
General Herring cites. All of those decisions, however, are now, doctrinally, ancient history. The
last Supreme Court marriage decision was a quarter century ago. At that time, in most of the US,
only married people could legally "cohabit"—that is, live together in a non-platonic way. The
Court's opinions emphasized that legal marriage was a pre-condition for lawfully creating a family
—forming close personal attachment, procreating and raising children together—an aspiration

sensibly characterized as an aspect of fundamental wellbeing and human right. Legal marriage is
simply no longer such a pre-condition for creating and enjoying a family. If the Justices are honest
when they squarely address The Big Question ("Must every state in the US confer marriage
certificates on same-sex couples?) they will acknowledge that it is no longer warranted to
characterize receipt of a state marriage certificate as a matter of fundamental right.
The importance of what is actually at stake for homosexual individuals today is thus insufficient
as a doctrinal matter to trigger strict scrutiny of state marriage laws. The alternative route to
strict, or at least "heightened" scrutiny, of state laws, is to show discrimination against a "suspect"
or "quasi-suspect" class of people. In explaining why he will not defend Virginia's marriage law,
Attorney General Herring also suggested that an additional reason for subjecting that law to
heightened judicial scrutiny is that it discriminates based on gender and sexual orientation.
Though some scholars and some lower courts have treated heterosexist marriage laws as gender
discrimination, which the Supreme Court has usually subjected to heightened scrutiny, it is
unlikely a majority of Supreme Court Justices would treat these laws as gender discrimination. It
is far less clear that such laws, which apply equally to men and women, are "about"
subordination of women than it was clear that Virginia's anti-miscegenation law, struck down in
Loving v. Virginia, was about subordination of blacks.
As for sexual orientation, the Court has thus far declined to hold that homosexuals constitute a
suspect or quasi-suspect class, and as with the fundamental-right argument, the argument that
homosexuals constitute such a class has been undermined by the very success of the gay-rights
movement. There is a fancy legal test for determining whether a group constitutes a suspect
class, but at base the point of declaring a group such is that the group members need courts to
protect them from a political process grossly unresponsive to their interests. In 2013 alone, five
states changed their marriage laws to include same-sex couples, through the political process,
without court compulsion. National polls now show most Americans support gay marriage.
Though homophobia and discrimination persist, the situation of homosexuals today is nothing
like that of blacks following abolition, when the Fourteenth Amendment and its Equal Protection
Clause were added to the Constitution, or even like that of blacks in the Jim Crow era, when the
Court established that it would subject racially discriminatory laws to strict scrutiny.
Many judges, including Supreme Court justices, are averse to designating new suspect classes
that get stronger judicial protection against discriminatory legislation, because doing so has a
long-term impact on separation of powers and democratic decision making in ways difficult to
predict. Many lower courts have sidestepped the suspect-class issue by holding that laws denying
state recognition to same-sex couples' relationships are unconstitutional even under rational
basis review. This amounts to saying not merely "the state has legitimate reasons for doing so

but they are not sufficiently compelling," but more starkly: "this serves no legitimate purpose
whatsoever." Most Americans might believe that, on balance, the right thing to do is to grant
homosexuals legal marriage. I myself do. But it might be only a small minority who would accept
a Supreme Court pronouncement that it is entirely irrational and illegitimate for a state's elected
officials to say:
"We are not required to have a legal status called marriage. We have nevertheless
done so historically because we hoped that by creating this special status, and by
conferring financial benefits and special recognition in exchange for a promise of
fidelity, we can induce some couples who are presumptively capable of procreating
through sexual activity to produce children only within an enduring, committed
relationship. We are not yet prepared to give up on that hope, and we simply have no
reason to offer those costly benefits to couples for whom accidental procreation is
not possible."

Though members of an elite class, the justices are not oblivious or insensitive to the general
public's perception of their honesty and rationality.
Finally, there is a yet-unrecognized intermediate position between the status quo and a Supreme
Court mandate that every state must issue marriage certificates to same-sex couples. It is the
position currently prevailing as to common law marriages and marriages between first cousins. In
some states a couple can become legally married by informal agreement and cohabitation, in
others not. In some states, first cousins can secure a marriage license, in others not. But all states
that do not have common law marriage treat as married any couples who migrate there after
becoming legally married informally in a state that does have common law marriage. Likewise, if
two first cousins legally marry in Virginia, where it is permitted, but move to or already live in a
state where it is not (Virginia has no residency requirement for marriage), the other state will
respect the marriage certificate Virginia issued. The Supreme Court might avoid The Big Question
by issuing a ruling on Full Faith and Credit requiring all states to recognize same-sex marriage
certificates issued in other states. A federal district court recently imposed such an order on
Ohio. Or a state might avoid a judicial mandate that it issue marriage certificates to same-sex
couples by deciding legislatively that it will henceforth give effect to such certificates other states
issue. Many legislators would regard this as a big concession, and same-sex couples might still
feel some sting of state denigration, but both sides might prefer this compromise to a loss in the
courts.
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